IDKMesh

As-built implementation and trust-boundary map

Source baseline: main@bee77a6125dbccb58f166ec363e978cd960f43f3, inspected 2026-10-10/11. This map is derived from the current source files and exposed handlers, not solely from older diagrams or future architecture proposals. Read the module-by-module inventory for all 85 direct installable Python files, the CLI and HTTP quick reference for supported entry points, and the capability matrix for controlled maturity/evidence claims.

What actually runs

Developer / operator
  |
  +-- idkmesh gate-audit / gate-marginal / dependence
  |     CLI (idkmesh/cli.py)
  |       -> pure verdict analysis (gate_audit.py, marginal_evidence*.py)
  |       -> diagnostic output / report, never approval
  |
  +-- idkmesh init --github --dry-run
  |       -> github_bootstrap.py -> github_bootstrap_render.py
  |       -> reproducible file/owner-action plan only, NO APPLY
  |
  +-- idkmesh doctor --github OBSERVATION [--workflow PATH]
  |       -> github_governance_policy.py -> github_governance_preflight.py
  |       -> fail-closed governance/workflow preflight only
  |       -> NO GitHub admin mutation, secret access, dispatch, acceptance, or merge
  |
  +-- idkmesh run create | status | evidence | list | cancel
  |       -> product_spine_run_store.py -> connector_store.py (local SQLite)
  |       -> local run/event projections, NO DISPATCH
  |
  +-- idkmesh local-loop CONFIG                  [checkout + verify extra]
  |       -> experiments/replay_run.py capture
  |       -> experiments/two_attempt_orchestrator.py
  |       -> independent verifier + run evidence report
  |       -> bounded local evidence/replay bundle
  |       -> human decision / replay remain separate, manual
  |
  +-- idkmesh control-tower [--product-spine-store SQLite]
          -> control_tower_ui.py (127.0.0.1:8770)
          -> control_tower_api.py (strict report validation + read projection)
          -> product_spine_run_store.py (optional read of local retained state)
          -> api_observability.py / service_runtime.py
          -> token-authenticated read-only /api/v1 + event SSE
          -> local browser; NO MUTATING HTTP CONTROLLER

The idkmesh Python distribution includes the package but not the research experiments/, sim/, tools/, scripts/, examples, or CI workflows. local-loop is intentionally checkout-dependent; installation alone is not evidence of a packaged standalone swarm runner. Consult the quick reference for invocations.

Product Spine, source binding and authority

Trusted WorkUnit + exact Git source
  |  work_unit_binding.py
  v
Preflight / routing evidence              [no dispatch authorization]
  |  coordination_preflight.py
  |  connector_profiles/registry/probe/routing/inspection.py
  v
Policy-owned execution admission          [separate from observation]
  |  executor_admission.py + task_claims.py (local)
  |  github_dispatch_authorization.py + github_explicit_dispatch.py
  |  (GitHub adapter; explicitly authorized and idempotent)
  v
Worker attempt + identity                  [worker assertion, NOT acceptance]
  |  local_agent_runner/sandbox/artifacts.py OR Jules lifecycle
  |  candidate_reference.py + github_candidate_reader.py
  v
Canonical ResultManifest / verification handoff
  |  result_manifest_builder.py + verification_handoff.py
  v
Independent verification / Run Evidence Report
  |  experiments/local_verifier.py, evaluator_plan_runner.py,
  |  run_evidence_report.py; pure offline Product Spine composition
  v
Human decision (distinct trusted ActorContext)
  |  human_decision_service.py (local service + immutable records)
  v
Separate project integration policy and actual Git merge authority

The arrows are semantic boundaries, not a claim that a single production service wires every stage automatically. In particular, provider completion does not validate the Git head, a verified artifact does not approve itself, a local UI session token does not confer a trusted human actor identity, and a stored decision does not push or merge code. Pure-domain lifecycle in product_spine.py, offline composition in product_spine_offline.py, and local SQLite orchestration in product_spine_run_store.py are deliberately separate implementations.

HTTP and browser profile

Browser / stdlib ControlTowerClient
    -> fixed 127.0.0.1 bind + Host/header validation
    -> X-IDKMesh-UI-Token (local session, not enterprise auth)
    -> content framing, bounded request size, timeout and concurrency
    -> /healthz, /readyz                    [operational]
    -> GET /api/v1/status/openapi.json/metrics
    -> POST /api/v1/run-evidence/inspect   [compute-only, no durable write]
    -> GET /api/v1/connections
    -> GET /api/v1/runs, .../attempts, .../evidence
    -> GET /api/v1/work-units, .../{id}, /projects/{id}
    -> GET /api/v1/events and /events/stream (SSE)

The runtime uses service_runtime.py for request correlation, readiness, resource ceilings and access logging; api_observability.py for privacy-safe fixed-cardinality operational metrics; and otel_metrics.py for offline OTLP/HTTP JSON mapping (not a built-in push exporter). OpenAPI is built by control_tower_api.openapi_document(); the running server’s GET /api/v1/openapi.json is the authoritative route/schema discovery surface.

Not routed: privileged POST /api/v1/human-decisions, connector mutation/dispatch APIs, an authenticated multi-tenant network service, or merge endpoints. human_decision_service.py and enterprise authorization kernels do not themselves make such routes available. See Control Tower Local API v0.1, API Conventions, and Enterprise Control Plane.

Connector and provider boundaries

Layer Source of truth Guarantees / limits
Versioned configuration connector_profiles.py, connector_secrets.py Validate metadata/secret references, not provider access
Driver and health connector_registry.py, connector_probe.py Static declarations and normalized observational probes; CLI connections probe uses offline fake drivers
Eligibility connector_routing.py, connector_inspection.py Deterministic selection/explanation; no authority escalation
GitHub ingress github_webhook_ingress.py, github_issue_preview.py Verify HMAC; issue text remains untrusted data; policy owns WorkUnit authority
GitHub governance preflight github_governance_policy.py, github_governance_preflight.py Evaluate trusted normalized protection/workflow observations and fail closed on required UNKNOWN/FAIL; no GitHub administration or secret-value access
GitHub mutable source github_branch_reader.py, github_candidate_reader.py Bind requested source/candidate to exact observed Git object identity
GitHub dispatch/publication github_delivery_idempotency.py, github_explicit_dispatch.py, github_status_comment.py Explicit actor/role authorization, idempotency/reconciliation; no automatic merge
Jules jules_sources.py, jules_sessions.py, jules_observation.py, jules_candidates.py, jules_candidate_binding.py, jules_lifecycle.py Provider Session completion is not trusted candidate identity or verification
Local coding agent agent_presets.py, local_agent_runner.py, local_agent_sandbox.py, local_agent_artifacts.py Fail-closed LocalSandboxExecutor; Linux bubblewrap network-disabled only, not arbitrary network-safe agent execution
OpenAI-compatible model openai_compatible*.py Model discovery/chat inference and capability evidence; model connection is not a coding-agent permission

The execution-substrate abstraction and GitHub-first deployment model remain architectural goals with bounded implemented slices. A local SQLite store is not a durable hosted multi-tenant state ledger, a GitHub publication projection is not independent evidence, and a policy object is not proof of a running provider integration.

Evidence, enterprise, research and automation

Failure and deployment boundaries

  1. No unattended merge path is implied. Verification, human authority, and integration remain different stages.
  2. No default cloud multi-user controller is implied. The local HTTP API is loopback-only with local session tokens; serverless/GitHub planning and local SQLite are not equivalents of enterprise auth.
  3. No universal hostile-code sandbox claim is implied. Bubblewrap support is limited to Linux network-disabled admission under host capability constraints; raw process limits are not isolation.
  4. No CI green claim is made from source inspection. New/modified documentation still needs exact-head link/schema/test gates when the PR is opened.
  5. No historical planned label is a current status. The 2026-09-23 API catalog is a planning snapshot; the current CLI/router and specifications win.

For developer help see troubleshooting, for source-by-source navigation see module map, and for the architectural contract outside this bounded as-built review see root architecture.